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Abstract. We develop a behavioral model of durable good usage with mental accounting
for sunk costs. It predicts higher-than-rational usage that attenuates at a rate that increases
with sunk costs. Singapore government policy varied the sunk cost of buying a new car.
Using Singapore data, we estimate the elasticity of driving with respect to sunk costs to be
0.048, which implies that government policy between 2009 and 2013 was associated with
86 kilometers per month, or 5.6%, more driving. The results are robust to specifying sunk
costs as relative to buyer income and estimation with Hong Kong data. We believe this to
be the first field evidence of the sunk cost fallacy in usage of a major durable good.
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1. Introduction
[C]ustomers who had initially paid more for a season sub-
scription to a theater series attended more plays during the
next 6 months, presumably because of their higher sunk cost
in the season tickets. —(Arkes and Blumer 1985, p. 124)
Economists and psychologists have long been inter-
ested in the effect of sunk costs on consumer choice
and organizational behavior (Thaler 1980 and 1990).
The sunk cost fallacy arises when individual actions
are influenced by costs that have already been incurred
and cannot be reversed. The actions serve to amortize
the psychological burden of the (irreversible) cost in a
mental account. Since sunk costs are irreversible, they
should not play any role in rational decision making.
Yet sunk costs have been implicated in apparently irra-
tional decisions across multiple contexts.
In what Eyster (2002) described as the “most con-
vincing single experiment” (p. 8), Arkes and Blumer
(1985) gave unannounced price discounts at random
to people buying season tickets at a university the-
ater. Over the first half of the season, individuals who
paid full price attended more shows than those who
received discounts (4.1 vis-à-vis 3.3 of 5 shows). In the
second half of the season, however, the two groups
did not behave differently. Gourville and Soman (1998)
observed “payment depreciation” among members of
an athletic club: monthly attendance peaked when the
members paid their half-yearly installment and then
declined with time. In a field experiment at an all-
you-can-eat-pizza restaurant, people who received a
discount ate less (Just and Wansink 2011). The three
studies suggest that sunk costs influence consumption.
The first two studies also indicate that the effect of sunk
costs declines over time.
However, in other field experiments, consumers
given random unannounced discounts did not evince
the sunk cost fallacy. Differences in the amounts that
Zambian consumers paid for Clorin, a chemical to treat
drinking water, did not affect their use of the chemi-
cal (Ashraf et al. 2010). In Kenya, there was no clear
relation between the net price that consumers paid for
insecticide-treated bed nets and their use of the nets
(Cohen and Dupas 2010).1
What about the effect of sunk costs on the usage of
a big-ticket durable good? Does amortization of the
mental account for sunk costs lead the decision maker
to increase or reduce usage over time?
The effect of sunk costs on decision making in re-
peated situations such as durable good usage has
important implications for management of businesses
and public administration as well as consumer behav-
ior.2 However, the issue remains an open question,
both in theory and empirically. Although Cohen and
Dupas (2010) studied the use of bed nets, which are
durable, they recorded usage just once. The Arkes and
Blumer (1985) experiment and Gourville and Soman
(1998) study pertain to usage of a facility, which differs
from a durable good in that increased consumption
does not affect the subsequent availability or quality of
the good. Buyers of season tickets and members of the
athletic club would not attend less to stretch out use of
the facility.
Here, we investigate whether sunk costs influence
use of a durable good in the context of the Singa-
pore car market. Car usage is an attractive setting
for investigation of the relation between sunk costs
and durable good usage. People have many years of
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experience with cars, and usage is sustained over long
periods of time. For instance, consumers engage in
mental accounting when buying gasoline (Hastings
and Shapiro 2013), and they are subject to projection
bias and salience when buying new cars (Busse et al.
2015). The Singapore context is particularly attractive
for several reasons. By design, government policies
to restrict car ownership require buyers of new cars
to make payments that are only partially refundable
and so impose explicit sunk costs. Over time, these
policies have generated substantial variation in the
sunk costs incurred in new car purchases (and, inci-
dentally, caused Singapore cars to become the world’s
most expensive; see Agarwal and Qian 2014). The gov-
ernment policies are long-standing and are repeat-
edly publicized, and thus, the sunk costs are certainly
salient to people in Singapore.
To investigate the effect of sunk costs, we first de-
velop a behavioral model of mental accounting to
understand how sunk costs might influence usage of a
durable good over time. Themodel stipulates that, over
some time horizon (Gourville and Soman 1998, Thaler
1999), buyers mentally account for the sunk cost of the
durable good. The model posits that the psychologi-
cal burden of mental accounting depends on the sunk
cost, cumulative usage, and their interaction. Under
a specific condition, the model implies that car usage
increases with the sunk cost and attenuates over time
and, importantly, that the rate of attenuation over time
increases with the sunk cost. This behavioral model of
mental accounting nests rational behavior, where sunk
costs do not affect decision making, as a special case.
Second, we take the behavioral model to structural
estimation on a large-scale observational data set com-
prising an unbalanced panel of 8,264 cars belonging
to a single brand that were sold in Singapore between
2000 and 2013. For each car, we have the accumulated
driving (in kilometers) at each service with the car
dealer. In the estimation, we exploit two sources of
variation—differences in the sunk costs between cars
withinmonths and changes in sunk costs over time due
to the continuing application of government policies.
In a major extension, we specify sunk costs as relative
to buyer’s income, proxied by home prices, and exploit
cross-sectional differences and time-series changes in
home prices as another source of variation in (relative)
sunk costs.
Figure 1 depicts average monthly usage with age
for cars purchased between 2003 and 2005, as the sunk
cost of buying cars decreased.3 Evidently, by Figure 1,
drivingwas uniformly higher for cars with higher sunk
costs, driving attenuated with age of the car, and the
rate of attenuation was higher with higher sunk costs.
Our structural estimates suggest that the elasticity of
usage with respect to the sunk cost of a car is 0.048
(s.e. 0.016). An increase in the sunk cost by S$13,038
Figure 1. Average Monthly Usage by Car Age
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Note. For the most popular model in the sample (3,403 cars).
(the outcome of government policy between 2009 and
2013) would be associated with an increase in monthly
driving by 86 kilometers, or 5.6%, in the first four years
of ownership.
We interpret the relation between the attenuation
of usage and the sunk cost as being due to mental
accounting for sunk costs. An obvious challenge to
our interpretation is some form of selection. In par-
ticular, when government policies cause the prices of
cars to increase, the people who buy cars are those
who want to drive more, and so, higher sunk costs are
associated with more driving. We address this selec-
tion explanation in several ways. First, the behavioral
model implies that the rate at which usage attenu-
ates with the age of the car increases with the sunk
cost. By contrast, selection need not imply any rela-
tion between car prices and the rate of attenuation.
Second, we estimate the structural model in terms of
first differences, rather than the levels of driving, and
so abstract from any buyer-specific fixed effect. Third,
we explicitly test and reject three alternative explana-
tions based on selection—people who pay more for
cars being subject to relatively more intense hedonic
adaptation (Frederick and Lowenstein 1999), demand
shocks leading people to buy cars at high prices fol-
lowed by reversion to the mean driving intensity, and
high initial driving leading to more frequent break-
downs and attenuation of driving.
In the Singapore context, the sunk costs are so large
that their influence on behavior might depend on the
buyer’s income. With this motivation, we extend the
behavioral model to specify sunk costs as relative to
household income, proxied by home prices. This exten-
sion exploits variation in both sunk costs and home
prices to identify the effect of (relative) sunk costs.
Importantly, the extension further mitigates concern
about selection by car prices as housing prices are not
related to car prices. We find that, consistent with the
behavioral model, driving and the rate of attenuation
with the age of the car increasewith relative sunk costs.
Yet another possible interpretation of our empir-
ical results distinguishes car buyers who differ in
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prior experience. The sunk cost fallacy is generally
related to the endowment effect in the sense that the
amount that the buyer has sunk can be viewed as
an endowment (Genesove and Mayer 2001). Endow-
ment effects are less intense among more experienced
persons (List 2003, 2004). Identifying more experi-
enced buyers as those who buy more expensive cars
or live in more expensive homes, we find mixed evi-
dence on the proposition that more experienced buy-
ers are less influenced by sunk costs. Our findings are
robust to other specifications of sunk costs and differ-
ences in sample, and survive validation and falsifica-
tion exercises.
Finally, we also test the behavioral model in Hong
Kong, a market where cars are expensive but the gov-
ernment does not explicitly impose sunk costs. We find
that sunk costs also influence Hong Kong car buyers to
drive more.
Overall, our empirical analysis suggests that buyers
of cars in Singapore and Hong Kong exhibited a sunk
cost fallacy and did not self-correct (or did not fully
self-correct) this decision bias. To our knowledge, this
is the first field evidence of the sunk cost fallacy in the
usage of a major durable good.
In the remainder of this paper, Section 2 describes
Singapore government policies on car ownership and
usage. Section 3 presents a behavioral model of men-
tal accounting for sunk costs, Section 4 presents the
empirical strategy, and Section 5 introduces the data.
Section 6 reports reduced-form estimates followed
by structural estimates of the behavioral model and
extended behavioral model, and Section 7 presents
a comparative analysis using Hong Kong data. Sec-
tion 8 discusses the implications of our findings for
policy and management, while Section 9 concludes.
The online appendix presents additional estimates that
explore heterogeneous effects and alternative specifica-
tions and rule out other selection-based explanations.
2. Singapore Car Policies
Singapore is a small, densely populated city-state,
which, like many other cities, faces the challenge of
managing traffic congestion. Since 1975, the Singa-
pore government has tackled traffic congestion in two
ways—pricing road usage and limiting the vehicle
population. While the government’s policies to man-
age traffic congestion target all vehicles, we focus on
cars in the discussion below. Initially, the government
sought to limit purchases of cars through a hefty tax,
the “Additional Registration Fee” (ARF), on new car
registrations. The ARF is based on the wholesale cost
or import price of the car, which is officially called the
“openmarket value” (OMV). At the time ofwriting, the
ARF was set at 100% of OMV. (No cars are manufac-
tured in Singapore. Since all are imported, the import
price equals the wholesale cost.)
Beginning in 1990, the Singapore government explic-
itly limited the number of new car registrations by
imposing a quota for a certificate of entitlement (COE).
A new car may be registered only with a COE, which
is valid for 10 years. The government sets the COE
quota so that the overall car population (net of cars
that are deregistered) does not exceed a specified tar-
get. Twice a month, the government holds an auction
for sale of the COEs. The official name for the price
of the COE is the “quota premium,” so-called because
it arises only if the number of bids for COEs exceeds
the quota. There has always been excess demand for
the quota, giving rise to a nonnegative COE premium.
Accordingly, in Singapore, the buyer of a new car pays
Retail_price  [1+ piARF + pitax] ·OMV+COE_premium
+Retail_markup, (1)
where piARF and pitax represent the rates of ARF and
other taxes, respectively.
One result of the Singapore’s government policy to
limit car ownership is that retail prices of cars are the
world’s highest. The average price of a car in our sam-
ple (what in Europe and the United States would be
considered a typically middle-class brand) is S$177,000
(US$115,000).
Buyers of new cars incur substantial policy-related
sunk costs as a result of the rebate structures of the
ARF and COE. Each COE is valid for 10 years. Once a
COE is used to register a new car, it cannot be detached
and used for another car. The owner can only deregis-
ter the car (and sell it to a scrap dealer or ship it out
of Singapore) and then apply to the government for a
rebate on the COE.
Within our period of study, the COE policy provided
a rebate for deregistration of a car on the following
terms. In the first two years of ownership, the rebate
is capped at 80% of the COE premium, and so, 20% of
the COE premium is sunk upon purchase of the car.
Thereafter, the rebate is prorated by the days remaining
until the car reaches 10 years of age. The COE expires
after 10 years, after which the owner must either renew
the COE or deregister the car.
Within our period of study, the ARF policy provided
a rebate for deregistration of a car on the following
terms. In the first five years of ownership, the rebate is
capped at 75% of the ARF, and so, 25% of the ARF is
sunk upon purchase of the car. Thereafter, the rebate is
prorated, 5% stepwise, by the number of years remain-
ing until the car reaches 10 years of age.4
Consequently, as Figure 2 illustrates, the purchase of
a new car involves two policy-related sunk costs:5
• Immediately after purchase, 20% of the COE pre-
mium is sunk. This cost does not vary with usage or
age. From the day after the first 24 months, the car
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Figure 2. (Color online) COE and ARF Rebate Structure
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owner forgoes the prorated part of the COE premium
each day, a cost that varies with age but not usage.
• Immediately after purchase, 25% of ARF is sunk.
This cost does not vary with usage or age. From the
day after the first 60 months, the car owner forgoes 5%
of the ARF each year, a cost that varies with the year
but not within the year and not with usage.
These sunk costs vary exogenously over time. Twice
a month, the COE premium equilibrates the demand
for new cars with quotas for new car registrations.
Recall that the quota is fixed according to a specific
formula. With changes in demand and quota, the COE
premium varies, and so, the COE-related sunk cost of
a new car purchase would vary.
The ARF and ARF-related sunk costs also fluctuate
over time. Since the ARF is specified as a percentage of
the OMV, any change in OMV as a result of changes in
exchange rates or themanufacturer’s wholesale pricing
would affect the ARF and, therefore, the ARF-related
sunk cost. Moreover, within a single brand, the ARFs
on the various models differ according to the differ-
ences in their respective OMVs.
We define the policy-related sunk cost as the sum of
COE premium*related and ARF-related sunk costs. As
Figure 3 shows, there is substantial variation in the
policy-related sunk cost, both cross-sectionally (due
to differences in the ARF among cars with different
wholesale cost) and over time (due to fluctuations in
COE premia and changes in ARF rates). The standard
deviation of the policy-related sunk cost is S$3,993
compared with the mean of S$17,154. We exploit this
variation to identify the effect of sunk costs on car
usage.
To better understand the policy background, Table 1,
column (a) reports a regression of the monthly COE
premium on the COE quota, measures of driving costs,
andmacroeconomic factors. The statistically significant
variables are the COE quota and macroeconomic fac-
tors (quarter and year fixed effects, not reported for
brevity). The coefficient of congestion, as measured by
the number of cars per kilometer of road, is negative
Figure 3. (Color online) Policy-Related Sunk Costs
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Notes. For all cars in the sample (8,264 cars). Average policy-related
sunk cost in the sample is S$17,154, with a standard deviation of
S$3,993.
but not precisely estimated. As an additional check,
Table 1, column (b) reports a regression of the change
(first difference) in the COE premium on the changes
in the various factors. Among the explanatory vari-
ables, only the change in the COE quota is (marginally)
significant. These results suggest that changes in COE
premia are primarily the result of exogenous factors
beyond the control of individual drivers.6
Table 1. COE Premium
(a) (b)
Variable COE premium Change in COE premium
Constant 163.856∗ 0.369
(87.964) (0.470)
COE quota (000’s) −4.667∗∗∗
(1.020)
Change in COE quota −2.088∗
(1.249)
CPI fuel index −0.026
(0.115)
Change in CPI fuel index −0.002
(0.144)
Cars per km −1.780∗
(0.991)
Change in cars per km −1.415
(1.246)
Quarterly GDP 0.800∗
(0.432)
Change in quarterly GDP 0.530
(0.409)
Year fixed effects Yes No
Quarter fixed effects Yes No
Observations 131 130
R-squared 0.953 0.04
Notes. Sample: April 2002–December 2013 (data on COE quota avail-
able since April 2002); COE premia are in thousands of Singapore
dollars, and GDP are in billions of Singapore dollars. Standard errors
are in parentheses.
∗∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗p < 0.1.
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3. Behavioral Model
To estimate the impact of sunk costs on car usage
and evaluate the corresponding policy implications,
we develop a model of driving behavior in the pres-
ence of mental accounting. We begin with a model of
rational behavior and then extend the model to include
mental accounting for sunk cost. The behavioral model
nests the rational model as a special case, and as a
consequence, we can empirically test whether the data
reject the rational model.
3.1. Rational Behavior
We focus on individuals who have already bought a car
and do not model the decision to buy a car.7 Consider
an individual who has just bought a car in period 0.
She must decide how many kilometers to drive, qt , in
each month t over a planning horizon, 1, . . . ,T. In each
month t, let the driver’s utility be
U(qt , t) B(qt , t) −C(qt , t) −D(qt , t), (2)
where B(qt , t) is the benefit from usage, C(qt , t)
is usage-related costs other than depreciation, and
D(qt , t) is depreciation.
Let the benefit from usage be
B(qt) θ0 + θ1qt − θ2q2t +φ(t)qt , (3)
or, equivalently, let the marginal benefit from usage be
B′(qt) θ1 − 2θ2qt +φ(t). (4)
We assume that θ1 , θ2 > 0, so that the marginal ben-
efit, B′( · ) > 0, and the marginal benefit diminishes
with usage, B′′( · ) < 0.8 The function, φ( · ), represents
the effect of time on marginal benefit. The driver’s
marginal benefit might decline with time for two rea-
sons. One is a taste for novelty—newer cars provide
more excitement. The other reason is that older cars
break down more frequently and so provide less bene-
fit. Consequently, the marginal benefit diminishes with
time (or more precisely, with the age of the car). On the
other hand, if the driver needs time to learn about the
various features of the car, her marginal benefit might
actually increase initially and then decline with time.
To allow for both possibilities, we specify that
φ(t) φ1t +φ2t2 , (5)
with no restriction on the signs of φ1 and φ2. With
regard to the cost of usage other than depreciation, we
assume that it comprises the perceived cost of gasoline
(petrol) and cost of congestion, both of which increase
linearly with usage. Specifically,
C(qt , t) β1gtqt + β2ctqt , (6)
where β1 , β2 > 0. On the right-hand side of (6), β1gt
represents the perceived cost of gasoline per kilometer
of usage, where gt is the price, and β2ct represents the
perceived cost of congestion per kilometer of usage,
where we measure ct by the number of cars per kilo-
meter of road.
As for depreciation, referring to the retail price of the
car in (1), let
P  Retail_price−ARF−COE_premium
 [1+ pitax] ·OMV+Retail_mark-up (7)
represent the “ex-policy price” of the car. We assume
that the depreciation of the retail price is additively
separable in time and usage. From the rebate structure
of the COE and ARF (described in Section 2), wemodel
the depreciation as
D(qt , t)  δ0[P − s0]+ δ1(t)[ARF − s1] · 1(t > 60)
+ δ2(t)[COE− s2] · 1(t > 24)+ δ3qt , (8)
where s0, s1, and s2 represent the sunk portions of the
ex-policy price, ARF, and COE premium, respectively;
δ0 is the depreciation rate of the ex-policy price; δ1(t)
and δ2(t) are the depreciation functions of the ARF and
COE premium, respectively (as given in Figure 2); and
δ3 is the rate of depreciation with usage.
Substituting above, the consumer’s utility is
U(qt , t)  θ0 + θ1qt − θ2q2t + [φ1t +φ2t2]qt − β1gtqt
− β2ctqt −D(qt , t). (9)
Assuming that the driver is forward-looking, in each
month t, she chooses usage qt to maximize the cumula-
tive utility of driving,∑TτtU(qτ , τ). Proposition 1 char-
acterizes the optimal usage.
Proposition 1. With rational behavior, the optimal usage in
month t  1, . . . ,T is
q∗t 
1
2θ2
[[θ1 − δ3]+φ1t +φ2t2 − β1gt − β2ct]. (10)
Proof. In each month t, the consumer chooses qt to
maximize
T∑
τt
U(qτ , τ) 
T∑
τt
[θ0 + θ1qτ − θ2q2τ + [φ1τ+φ2τ2]qτ
−β1gτqτ − β2cτqτ −D(qτ , τ)]. (11)
Substituting from (8) andmaximizing (11) with respect
to qt , the optimal usage is given by
2θ2q∗t  [θ1 − δ3]+φ1t +φ2t2 − β1gt − β2ct , (12)
for all t. 
By Proposition 1, the optimal usage is independent
of the sunk costs, s0, s1, and s2, related to the ex-policy
price, ARF, and COE premium, respectively. It varies
with time according to (5) and declines with the costs
of gasoline and congestion.
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3.2. Mental Accounting for Sunk Costs
Next, we generalize the model to allow for the sunk
cost fallacy. Suppose that the driver’s utility in month t
depends on both usage and mental accounting for the
sunk cost in the following way:
U(Qt , qt , t)

{
B(qt)−C(qt , t)−D(qt , t)−M(S,Qt) if t ≤TS ,
B(qt)−C(qt , t)−D(qt , t) if t >TS .
(13)
Within the horizon t ≤ TS, (13) differs from the model
of rational behavior by the additional term M(S,Qt),
which represents the psychological disutility of carry-
ing a mental account of the sunk cost S and cumulative
mileage Qt .
Gourville and Soman (1998) and Thaler (1999) find
that sunk costs are salient and influence behavior, with
diminishing effect, over a finite period. Accordingly,
we stipulate that the mental accounting lasts for some
finite horizon, TS. Beyond the horizon, for t > TS, the
sunk cost is sufficiently remote such that it does not
affect the driver, and so, her usage follows the rational
model.
Referring to Section 2 and Figure 2, the structure of
Singapore government policies suggests that the men-
tal accounting horizon might range between 24 and
60 months. With regard to the COE premium, 20%
is nonrefundable, while the refundable part declines
on a daily basis from the third until the 10th year. So
the nonrefundable sunk part of the COE premium is
similar to a lump sum payment for two years, which
suggests that drivers might carry a mental account
for 24 months. As for the ARF, 25% is nonrefundable,
while the refundable part declines in steps of 5% each
year from the 6th until the 10th year. So the nonrefund-
able sunk part of the ARF is similar to paying a lump
sum for five years, which suggests that drivers might
carry a mental account for 60 months.
We stipulate that the psychological disutility is well
behaved in the following sense: M(S,Qt) decreases
in Qt , with limt→TS M(S,Qt)  0. Under this assump-
tion, the psychological disutility of carrying the mental
account diminishes with cumulative usage. Intuitively,
as the driver accumulates usage, the sunk cost becomes
less salient and its psychological effect wears off.
To maintain analytical tractability without loss of
generality, we specify the psychological disutility as a
linear function of cumulative mileage, sunk cost, and
their interaction:
M(S,Qt) λ1 + λ2Qt + λ3S+ λ4S ·Qt . (14)
Substituting from (3), (5), (6), (8), and (14) in (13), the
driver’s utility within the mental accounting horizon,
TS, simplifies to
U(Qt , qt , t)
 θ0 + θ1qt − θ2q2t + [φ1t +φ2t2]qt − β1gtqt − β2ctqt
−[δ0[P − s0]+ δ1(t)[ARF − s1] · 1(t > 60)
+δ2(t)[COE− s2] · 1(t > 24)+ δ3qt]
−[λ1 + λ2Qt + λ3S+ λ4S ·Qt]. (15)
Assume that the driver is forward-looking and, in
each month t, chooses usage qt to maximize Ut ≡∑TS
τtU(Qτ , qτ , τ). The driver accounts for the effect of
qt on future utility through the cumulative usage up
to month t, Qt 
∑t
τ1 qτ. Within the horizon, TS, we
characterize the driver’s usage in the last month, q∗TS ,
and then work backward, solving for q∗TS−1, etc. Specif-
ically, for each t  TS ,TS − 1, . . . , 2, 1, differentiate Ut
with respect to qt to obtain the first-order condition.
Differentiating the cumulative expected utility for
t  TS,
dUTS
dqTS

dU(QTS , qTS ,TS)
dqTS
 [θ1 − δ3] − 2θ2qTS +φ1TS +φ2T2S
− β1gTS − β2cTS − λ2 − λ4S  0,
and hence,
q∗TS 
1
2θ2
{[θ1 − δ3]+φ1TS +φ2T2S − β1gTS − β2cTS
−λ2 − λ4S}.
Similarly, differentiating the cumulative expected util-
ity for t  TS − 1 and simplifying the terms,
dUTS−1
dqTS−1

dU(QTS , qTS ,TS)
dqTS−1
+
dU(QTS−1 , qTS−1 ,TS − 1)
dqTS−1
 [θ1 − δ3] − 2θ2qTS−1 +φ1[TS − 1]+φ2[TS − 1]2
− β1gTS−1 − β2cTS−1 − 2λ2 − 2λ4S  0,
which yields
q∗TS−1 
1
2θ2
{[θ1 − δ3]+φ1[TS − 1]+φ2[TS − 1]2
−β1gTS−1 − β2cTS−1 − 2λ2 − 2λ4S}.
Reasoning recursively, we can show that the optimal
usage in months t  1, . . . ,TS is
q∗t 
1
2θ2
{[θ1 − δ3]+φ1t +φ2t2 − β1gt − β2ct
−λ2[TS − t + 1] − λ4[TS − t + 1]S}. (16)
For months t  TS + 1, . . . ,T, the optimal usage is char-
acterized by the rational model (10). Accordingly, we
have the following.
Proposition 2. With mental accounting for sunk costs, the
driver chooses usage,
q∗t

1
2θ2
{[θ1− δ3]+φ1t+φ2t2− β1gt − β2ct
−λ2[TS − t+1]−λ4S[TS − t+1]} if t ≤TS ,
1
2θ2
{[θ1− δ3]+φ1t+φ2t2− β1gt − β2ct} if t >TS .
(17)
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Notice that if λ2  λ4  0, then (17) simplifies to (10).
Hence, the model of mental accounting nests rational
behavior as a special case.
To characterize the implications of mental account-
ing for sunk costs on usage, consider the marginal
effect of the sunk cost on the driver’s choice of usage.
Differentiating (17) with respect to S,
dq∗t
dS
−λ4[TS − t + 1], (18)
for t ≤ TS.
If λ4 < 0, then the empirical implication of mental
accounting for sunk costs is higher usage at all times, to
an extent that diminishes linearly with time. If λ4  0,
then dq∗t/dS  0, and the mental accounting for sunk
costs has no effect on usage. By contrast, if λ4 > 0, then
the empirical implication is lower usage that rises over
time. Thus we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1. With mental accounting for sunk costs, the
driver chooses usage q∗t in months t  1, . . .TS that
(a) if λ4 < 0, increases in the sunk cost and attenuates
over time at a rate that increases in the sunk cost, or
(b) if λ4 > 0, decreases in the sunk cost and rises over
time at a rate that increases in the sunk cost.
The behavioral model of mental accounting encom-
passes two very different theories of how sunk costs
influence the driver’s behavior. Under one theory
(λ4 < 0), the driver amortizes the burden of the sunk
cost by the accumulated usage. At each point in time,
the more the driver has used the car up to then, the
smaller the mental burden of the sunk cost. Under an
alternative theory (λ4 > 0), the driver wants to stretch
out the use of the car over the mental accounting hori-
zon. Intuitively, the more she has used the car, the
larger the mental burden of the sunk cost.
Figure 4 illustrates the difference in the trajectory of
usage with and without mental accounting. Assume
that the costs of gasoline and congestion, gt , ct ,
are constant and that there is no time (age)-depen-
dent marginal benefit, φ1  φ2  0. Then, with ratio-
nal behavior, the monthly usage would be constant
throughout.
By contrast, comparing (17) with (10), mental ac-
counting for sunk costs can affect usage within the
mental accounting horizon in twoways. If λ4 < 0, then a
larger sunk cost would be associatedwith higher usage
and faster attenuation. By contrast, if λ4 > 0, then a
larger sunk cost would be associated with lower usage
and faster appreciation.
The effect of the sunk cost on the rate of change
of usage over the mental accounting horizon is the
essence of our empirical strategy. This effect on the
rate of change of usage distinguishes the model of
mental accounting for sunk costs from the most obvi-
ous alternative explanation of any empirical relation
Figure 4. (Color online) Effect ofMental Accounting for Sunk
Costs on Car Usage
TS + 1
Car age (months)
T0
Optimal usage with Ë4 < 0 and larger sunk cost
Optimal usage with Ë4 < 0 and smaller sunk cost
Optimal usage with Ë4 = 0, rational behavior
Ca
r u
sa
ge
 (k
m/
m
o
n
th
)
Optimal usage with Ë4 > 0 and larger sunk cost
Optimal usage with Ë4 > 0 and smaller sunk cost
Notes. Monthly car usage assuming cost of gasoline and congestion
fixed over time and no time (age)-dependent marginal benefit.
between usage and sunk costs, which is selection
(called “screening” by Ashraf et al. 2010). Selection
causes higher sunk costs to be associated with higher
usage in the following way. When COE premia and
ARF are higher, the prices of new cars are higher. With
the increase in price, people who plan to drive less
would be less likely to buy cars; thus, the population of
car owners would comprise relatively more intensive
drivers. An increase in usage with respect to the price
of the car may be associated with mental accounting
for sunk costs or with selection. However, it is challeng-
ing to explain the rate of attenuation or appreciation of
driving by selection. By contrast, our behavioral model
specifically implies that, with mental accounting for
sunk costs, the effect of the sunk cost should attenuate
or increase over time and therefore affect the rate at
which driving attenuates or rises over time.9
By Corollary 1, if λ4 < 0, the effect of the sunk cost
attenuates over time. The essential reason is the struc-
ture of the mental accounting. Referring to (14), in each
month, as the driver looks forward, the mental burden
of the sunk cost is reduced by the cumulative usage.
In the earlier months, the weight of the mental account
is large, and therefore the impact on usage is large. By
contrast, closer to the terminal month, the mental bur-
den is smaller, and the impact on usage diminishes.
Accordingly, it is optimal for the driver to use the car
relatively more in the earlier months to the extent that
the sunk cost is larger. This provides us with a clear,
empirically testable parameter restriction.
This theoretical implication is consistent with two
previous empirical studies. In the experiment by Arkes
and Blumer (1985), consumers who paid a higher price
for the season ticket attended more shows in the first
half of the season, but not in the second half. Gourville
and Soman (1998) monitored attendance at an athletic
facility by members who paid for a one-year member-
ship in two semiannual installments. Members visited
the facilitymost during themonth of paying the install-
ment, and their visits declined with each succeeding
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month. Both studies found that the sunk cost fallacy
affected behavior only for a finite period of time.
4. Empirical Strategy
To set up the econometric model for structural estima-
tion, let the actual usage of individual driver i inmonth
t (or more precisely, the age of the car in months) be
qit  q∗it + it , where it is an error. Substituting from
(17) for q∗it and assuming θ2 
1
2 ,
qit  [θ1 − δ3] − λ2[TS − t + 1] · 1t≤TS +φ1t +φ2t2
− β1gt − β2ct − λ4[TS − t + 1]Si · 1t≤TS + it , (19)
for i  1, . . . ,N .
Assume that the error, it , comprises two elements,
it  ξi + νit , (20)
where νit is pure individual and time-specific idiosyn-
cratic error and ξi is an individual fixed effect that
captures all unobservable time-invariant attributes of
the owner that may influence usage. The individual
fixed effect abstracts from differences including selec-
tion by driving intensity—for instance, when higher
car prices selectively screen out those who plan to
drive less intensively. The individual fixed effect also
abstracts from changes in the composition of buy-
ers over time. Furthermore, the individual fixed effect
abstracts from differences between first and second
cars. Two-car households would drive each car less
than one-car households.10
Our data on car usage are based on periodic services
of each car at irregular time intervals. To apply the
econometric model, we organize the data as monthly
averages between service visits. Suppose that car i was
serviced inmonths, tir , where r  1, 2, . . . ,R, and ti0  0.
Then, define the interservice average of usage,
qir ≡ 1tir − ti , r−1
tir∑
τti , r−1+1
qiτ , (21)
the interservice average of the remaining horizon,
the interservice average of the age of the car, and
the interservice average of the square of the car age,
respectively:
m1, ir ≡ 1tir − ti , r−1
tir∑
τti , r−1+1
[TS − τ+ 1] · 1[τ ≤ TS],
m2, ir ≡ 1tir − ti , r−1
tir∑
τti , r−1+1
τ, (22)
zir ≡ 1tir − ti , r−1
tir∑
τti , r−1+1
τ2.
Likewise, define the interservice averages of the
cost of petrol, congestion, and idiosyncratic error,
respectively:
gir ≡ 1tir − ti , r−1
tir∑
τti , r−1+1
gτ ,
cir ≡ 1tir − ti , r−1
tir∑
τti , r−1+1
cτ , (23)
νir ≡ 1tir − ti , r−1
tir∑
τti , r−1+1
νiτ .
Substituting the above and (20) in (19),
qir  [θ1 − δ3] − λ2m1, ir +φ1m2, ir +φ2zir − β1gir
− β2cir − λ4Sim1, ir + ξi + νir , (24)
for r  1, 2, . . . ,R. To abstract from the individual fixed
effect, we recast the model in first differences, which
yields the following estimation model:
∆qir  −λ2∆m1, ir +φ1∆m2, ir +φ2∆zir − β1∆gir
− β2∆cir − λ4Si∆m1, ir +∆νir , (25)
where∆qir ≡ qir−qi , r−1,∆m1, ir ≡m1, ir−m1, i , r−1,∆m2, ir ≡
m2, ir−m2, i , r−1,∆zir ≡ zir− zi , r−1,∆gir ≡ gir− gi , r−1,∆cir ≡
cir − ci , r−1 and ∆νir ≡ νir − νi , r−1.
5. Data
Our primary source of data is the sole authorized
dealer for a midmarket brand of cars in Singapore. The
dealer provided the complete service records of all new
cars sold between 2000 and 2013 under a nondisclosure
agreement for this study. The cars are different models
of the same brand.
Owners bring their cars to the authorized dealer
for maintenance service. The service records for each
car include the date of registration, engine size, ser-
vice dates, and odometer readings. To protect customer
privacy, the dealer did not provide any demographic
information on the car buyers.
In our sample, the maximum observed age is 119
months, which is less than the lifespan of a COE
(120months).11 To exclude outliers, we further limit the
sample to cars with usage within two standard devi-
ations of the logarithm of the average monthly usage.
After cleaning for obvious recording errors (mainly
cars with odometer readings that decreased over time),
excluding cars that were defective (identified by pre-
mature service visits), and excluding cars with fewer
than two service records, the final sample comprises
8,264 cars with 45,195 service visits.
The cars were purchased at different times, and
the owners perform maintenance at varying intervals;
thus, the cars have different numbers of service visits.
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Table 2. Summary Statistics
Variable Unit Mean s.d. Min Max
Usage 1,000 kilometers per month 1.545 0.529 0.539 4.189
Age of car at last service Months 49.2 21.9 5 119
Retail price S$ million 0.177 0.031 0.110 0.317
ARF S$ million 0.047 0.009 0.031 0.092
COE premium S$ million 0.027 0.016 0.001 0.096
Policy-related sunk costs S$ million 0.017 0.004 0.009 0.032
Relative policy-related sunk costs S$ million 0.020 0.006 0.005 0.078
Gasoline price January 2006 100 106.64 16.80 69.10 130.82
Congestion Cars per kilometer 99.27 7.47 82.85 106.33
Notes. As of January 1, 2007, US$1  S$1.54. Policy-related sunk costs is the sum of COE- and ARF-related
sunk costs; Relative policy-related sunk costs is the policy-related sunk costs divided by the CPI-adjusted
average price per square meter in units of Singapore thousands of dollars.
Accordingly, the data constitute an unbalanced panel
of cars with average monthly usage ranging between
539 and 4,189 kilometers (or, equivalently, annual
usage ranging between 4,042 and 31,418 miles).12
Our next source of data is the Land Transport
Authority (LTA). The LTA collects and publishes the
retail price, OMV, ARF, and COE for each brand and
model of car on a monthly basis. We match this infor-
mation by month and engine size to the registration of
each car. In addition, to estimate the extension of the
behavioral model to relative sunk costs, the LTA pro-
vided us with the address of car buyers by postal sec-
tor and date of registration (Singapore is divided into
90 postal sectors). Wematch this information by engine
size and date of registration to each car. To proxy for
the income of car buyers, we collect the prices of all
high-rise residential property purchases between 2000
and 2013 from the Urban Redevelopment Authority.
For each postal sector and year, we compute the aver-
age price per square meter of high-rise homes adjusted
for inflation by the Consumer Price Index (CPI). To
represent the price of gasoline, we use the CPI of
98 octane petrol, and to represent traffic congestion, we
use the number of cars (published monthly) divided
by the quantity of road space in kilometers (published
annually).
Table 2 reports summary statistics of the data. The
average monthly usage in the sample is 1,545 kilo-
meters. The retail price of the cars ranges between
S$110,000 and S$317,000 with an average of S$177,000,
while the average ARF and COE premium are S$47,000
and S$27,000, respectively. So, the ARF and COE con-
tribute about 42% of the retail price. Importantly, the
policy-related sunk costs, defined as the sum of the
COE- and ARF-related sunk costs, ranges between
S$9,000 and S$32,000, with an average of S$17,000
(equivalent to US$11,000). The relative policy-related
sunk cost, defined as the policy-related sunk costs
divided by the CPI-adjusted average price per square
meter of high-rise homes, ranges between S$5,000 and
S$78,000, with an average of S$20,000.13
6. Results
Our behavioral model (Corollary 1) predicts that,
if λ4 < 0, then optimal usage attenuates over time.
Figure 1 provides some coarse evidence of such atten-
uation, which is consistent with mental accounting for
sunk costs, in a way that the mental burden diminishes
with cumulative usage.
To further explore the data, we carry out some
reduced-form analyses. Figure 5 presents locally
weighted polynomial regressions of cumulative usage
up to three, four, and five years on the retail price
and policy-related sunk costs. Panel (A) suggests that
cumulative usage and retail price tended to covary, but
the relation is not monotone. By contrast, in panel (B),
there seems to be a clear monotone relation between
cumulative usage and the policy-related sunk cost.
Next, we use least squares to regress the average
monthly usage between successive service visits on the
retail car price and sunk costs. Figure 5 suggests that
the effects of price and sunk costs might vary with
the age of the car. Accordingly, we include interactions
between price and sunk costs and age of car as addi-
tional explanatory variables.
Table 3 reports the estimates. Column (a) shows that
average monthly usage is not associated with retail
price. Column (b) shows that the coefficient of the
policy-related sunk costs is positive but not precisely
estimated, and the coefficient of the policy-related sunk
costs interacted with the age of car is negative and sig-
nificant. Apparently, higher policy-related sunk costs
are associated with more driving and faster attenua-
tion with age of the car. Next, column (c) distinguishes
the COE-related from the ARF-related sunk costs. The
estimate suggests that driving is related to the COE but
not the ARF.
Overall, the evidence presented in Figure 5 and
Table 3 is consistent with our behavioral model of men-
tal accounting—specifically, Corollary 1 with λ4 < 0.
The sunk cost of purchase is associatedwithmore driv-
ing, and driving attenuates at a rate that increases with
the policy-related sunk costs and, in particular, the part
related to the COE premium.
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Figure 5. (Color online) Cumulative Usage, Retail Car Price,
and Policy-Related Sunk Costs
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Notes. For the entire sample (8,264 cars). Regression graphs and
standard errors are generated using a locally weighted polynomial
regression. The dashed curves represent the upper and lower bounds
of the 95% confidence interval. Panel (A) depicts regressions of
cumulative usage up to three years (lower graph), four years (middle
graph), and five years (upper graph) on retail price (in thousands of
Singapore dollars). Panel (B) depicts regressions of cumulative usage
up to three years (lower graph), four years (middle graph), and five
years (upper graph) on the policy-related sunk costs (in thousands
of Singapore dollars).
While suggestive of the sunk cost fallacy, Figure 5
and Table 3 are reduced-form analyses that do not
allow counterfactual policy and managerial analyses.
Accordingly, we now turn to structural estimation of
the behavioral model, (25). Although the data set com-
prises 45,195 service records, after first-differencing,
the estimation sample comprises 36,931 observations.
First, to provide a point of reference, we estimate
the rational model, i.e., assuming that λ2  λ4  0. Esti-
mates of this model are reported in Table 4, column (a).
The coefficient of the perceived price of gasoline, β1,
is positive and significant. This is consistent with the
intuition that higher fuel cost decreases usage. The
coefficient of the perceived cost of congestion, β2, is
positive and also significant.14 Regarding the effect of
car age on usage, φ1 is positive and significant, while φ2
is negative and significant. The estimated coefficients
suggest that the effect of “novelty” is to increase usage
over the first 66 months and decrease thereafter.
Next, we turn to estimate the behavioral model. Re-
call from (7) that the retail price comprises the ex-
policy price, COE premium, and ARF. By government
design (see Figure 2), elements of the COE premium
and ARF are sunk according to specified schedules.
Furthermore, just as in any other car market, part
of the ex-policy price may be sunk. Accordingly, we
generalize (25) to distinguish the policy-related sunk
costs, with coefficient λ41, and the ex-policy price, with
coefficient λ42.
Another issue is the length of the mental accounting
horizon. Above, in developing the behavioral model,
we inferred from the structure of the COE and ARF
refunds that the mental accounting horizon might
range between 24 and 60 months. Accordingly, Table 4
reports structural estimates of the behavioral model at
various horizons.
The estimates for 24- to 72-month horizons are con-
sistent in several ways—the coefficients of the per-
ceived costs of gasoline and congestion are positive and
significant, the coefficients of age and age squared are
positive and negative, respectively, and both are signif-
icant. The coefficient of the policy-related sunk costs is
negative and precisely estimated, and interestingly, the
magnitude of the coefficient declines with the length
of the horizon. The ex-policy price is not significant.
Recall that the rational model is the model of men-
tal accounting subject to the restriction that the coef-
ficients of the sunk costs and the remaining horizon
are zero; λ2  λ41  λ42  0. Table 4 reports F-tests of
these restrictions. Across all horizons, the F-statistics
suggest rejection of the null hypothesis that λ2  λ41 
λ42  0. Apparently, the mental accounting parameters
are significant.
The general picture is that, empirically, driving was
sensitive to gasoline prices, congestion, and novelty,
and—most important—it was sensitive to sunk costs
within amental accounting horizon of 24 to 72months.
Referring to Corollary 1, our results are consistent with
λ4 < 0 and a trajectory of higher-than-rational usage
that attenuates at a rate that increases with the sunk
cost. Our results suggest that car buyers did mentally
account for the sunk elements of the ARF and COE
premium.
Among the alternative horizons, we prefer 48
months (see Table 4, column (d)). This fits between the
horizons of 24 to 60 months that we intuitively expect
from the structure of the COE and ARF rebates. Sta-
tistically, this specification yields the best fit (largest
R-squared and (natural) log likelihood).
With a 48-month mental accounting horizon, the
coefficient of the mental accounting of the policy-
related sunk costs, λ41  −0.177 (s.e. 0.058), is negative
and precisely estimated. To interpret this coefficient,
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Table 3. Sunk Cost and Car Usage: Reduced-Form Estimates
(b) (c)
(a) Policy-related Separate COE/ARF
Price sunk costs sunk costs
Price −0.098
(0.814)
Price×Average age 0.006
(0.021)
Policy-related sunk costs 12.567∗
(7.054)
Policy-related sunk costs×Average age −0.655∗∗∗
(0.220)
COE-related sunk cost 17.822∗
(9.233)
COE-related sunk cost×Average age −0.892∗∗∗
(0.345)
ARF-related sunk cost 3.942
(14.845)
ARF-related sunk cost×Average age −0.396
(0.350)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Engine size fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8,264 8,264 8,264
R-squared 0.045 0.046 0.046
ln likelihood −6,287 −6,281 −6,281
F-statistic 0.000 2.788 2.479
p-value 1.000 0.025 0.021
Notes. Estimated using ordinary least squares. The dependent variable is average monthly usage (in
thousands of kilometers per month) until the last service. Price and sunk costs are in millions of
Singapore dollars. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
∗∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗p < 0.1.
we compute the elasticity of usage with respect to the
sunk cost as being 0.048 (s.e. 0.016).15 To gauge the
significance of this estimate, consider the increase in
the average policy-related sunk cost by S$13,038 from
S$11,278 to S$24,316 (equivalently, by 116%) between
January 2009 and January 2013, mainly as a result of an
increase in COE premium. Using our estimated elas-
ticity, this increase in sunk cost would be associated
with an increase in usage by 5.6%, or 86 kilometers a
month.16
We believe that the actual effect of the sunk cost ex-
ceeds this estimate. Drivers would respond to the sunk
cost by varying their discretionary driving (their non-
discretionary driving, commuting towork and sending
children to school, for example, would respond less).
The effect of the sunk cost would be larger if it were
expressed as a proportion of the discretionary driving.
Moreover, our estimate of the effect of sunk cost on car
usage did not control for income effects. An increase in
theCOEorARFwould reduce thebuyer’s discretionary
income and so lead to a reduction in all consumption,
includingdriving (Thaler 1980, pp. 49–50).Accordingly,
our estimate of the sunk cost effect is conservative.17
6.1. Relative Sunk Costs
Intuitively, a sunk cost of S$17,000 (US$11,000) would
loom much larger for a middle-income buyer than for
one of the top 1%. Hence, the effect of sunk costs on
driving might depend on the buyer’s income, with a
larger effect among buyers with lower incomes. This
motivates us to estimate the behavioral model, (25),
with sunk costs specified relative to buyer income. The
model of relative sunk cost is interesting as such, and
also as a way to identify the effect of sunk costs by
variation on another dimension—buyer’s income.
Lacking data on buyers’ incomes, we use the unit
price of housing in their residential neighborhood,
specifically the postal sector, as a proxy. We then spec-
ify relative policy-related sunk costs as the ratio of the
policy-related sunk costs to the CPI-adjusted price per
square meter of high-rise homes in each postal sec-
tor. The sample is somewhat smaller as service records
for some cars could not be matched with the buyer’s
neighborhood. Table 5 reports the estimates of the
rational model and the behavioral model for horizons
of 24 to 72 months.
The coefficients of the gasoline price, congestion,
age, and age squared are quite similar to those in
Table 4, with the policy-related sunk costs specified
in their native form, not deflated by housing prices.
The coefficient of the relative policy-related sunk costs
is negative and significant across all horizons. The
coefficient declines from the 24-month horizon to a
minimum with the 48-month horizon, and then it
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Table 4. Sunk Cost and Car Usage: Structural Estimates
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Rational Horizon: Horizon: Horizon: Horizon: Horizon:
Variable model 24 months 36 months 48 months 60 months 72 months
Gasoline price, β1 × 10 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Congestion, β2 0.006∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age, φ1 × 10 0.104∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.247∗∗∗ 0.352∗∗∗ 0.310∗∗∗ 0.298∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.010) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014)
Age squared, φ2 × 100 −0.011∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗ −0.026∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Policy-related sunk costs, λ41 −0.354∗∗∗ −0.291∗∗∗ −0.177∗∗∗ −0.159∗∗∗ −0.146∗∗∗
(0.084) (0.066) (0.058) (0.053) (0.052)
Ex-policy price, λ42 −0.010 −0.007 −0.011 0.012 0.013
(0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009)
Remaining horizon, λ2 × 10 0.010∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 36,931 36,931 36,931 36,931 36,931 36,931
Cars 8,264 8,264 8,264 8,264 8,264 8,264
R-squared 0.010 0.011 0.013 0.017 0.014 0.013
ln likelihood −23,854 −23,839 −23,803 −23,727 −23,773 −23,794
F-test statistic (vs. rational model) NA 10.768 33.905 83.563 54.030 40.091
p-value NA <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Elasticity NA 0.049∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗
Elasticity s.e. NA (0.012) (0.013) (0.016) (0.018) (0.023)
Notes. Estimated by ordinary least squares. The dependent variable is first difference of usage (in thousands of kilometers per month). Gasoline
price is represented by CPI of 98 octane petrol, and Congestion is represented by the number of cars per kilometer. Age is in number of months
since registration; Policy-related sunk costs and Ex-policy price are in millions of Singapore dollars. Robust standard errors clustered by car are
in parentheses. The F-test evaluates the null hypothesis that coefficients of policy-related sunk costs, ex-policy price, and remaining horizon
jointly are equal to zero; i.e., the rational model is valid.
∗∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗p < 0.1.
rises for longer horizons. Across all horizons, the F-
statistics suggest rejection of the null hypothesis that
λ2  λ41  λ42  0. Apparently, the mental accounting
parameters are significant.
Among the estimates, the 48-month horizon pro-
vides the best fit. The coefficient of relative policy-
related sunk costs, −0.095 (s.e. 0.044), implies an
elasticity of 0.029 (s.e. 0.014). Comparing the models
with raw sunk costs (see Table 4) and relative sunk
costs (see Table 5), the results are quite similar. We
slightly prefer the model with raw sunk costs as it is
simpler.
6.2. Further Robustness Tests
The online appendix presents additional estimates that
explore heterogeneous effects, by size of car and struc-
ture of government policy, and confirm robustness to
alternative specifications of sunk costs and salience of
COE premia. The online appendix also presents vali-
dation and falsification exercises, showing that higher
sunk costs are associated with lower consumer expen-
diture on public transport (which is consistent with
more driving) but are not significantly related to con-
sumer expenditure at supermarkets or restaurants.
Furthermore, the online appendix investigates and
rejects three alternative explanations based on selec-
tion: people who pay more for cars being subject to
relatively more intense hedonic adaptation (Frederick
and Lowenstein 1999),18 demand shocks leading peo-
ple to buy cars at high prices followed by reversion
to the mean driving intensity, and high initial driving
leading to more frequent breakdowns and attenuation
of driving.
7. Hong Kong
To provide a comparative analysis, we procured infor-
mation on the same brand of cars for 962 cars sold
between 2001 and 2013 in Hong Kong. We first qual-
ify that the analysis of Hong Kong behavior might be
less reliable than that of Singapore, which is based on
a larger sample, more precise data on prices, and most
important, a government policy that clearly specifies
the sunk costs. However, to the extent that other gov-
ernments do not explicitly impose sunk costs, theHong
Kong findings may be more broadly applicable.
Singapore and Hong Kong are quite similar—both
are highly urbanized with a substantial middle class,
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Table 5. Relative Sunk Cost and Car Usage: Structural Estimates
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Rational Horizon: Horizon: Horizon: Horizon: Horizon:
Variable model 24 months 36 months 48 months 60 months 72 months
Gasoline price, β1 × 10 0.007∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.006∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Congestion, β2 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.002 0.002 0.003∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age, φ1 × 10 0.105∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗ 0.350∗∗∗ 0.305∗∗∗ 0.295∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.010) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.014)
Age squared, φ2 × 100 −0.011∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗ −0.026∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Relative policy-related sunk costs, λ41 −0.268∗∗∗ −0.166∗∗∗ −0.095∗∗ −0.121∗∗∗ −0.121∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.050) (0.044) (0.040) (0.039)
Relative ex-policy price, λ42 0.003 0.000 −0.007 0.009 0.011∗
(0.012) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006)
Remaining horizon, λ2 × 10 0.008∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 36,293 36,293 36,293 36,293 36,293 36,293
Cars 8,121 8,121 8,121 8,121 8,121 8,121
R-squared 0.010 0.011 0.013 0.017 0.014 0.013
ln likelihood −23,428 −23,413 −23,377 −23,302 −23,348 −23,369
F-test statistic (vs. rational model) NA 10.966 34.530 85.109 53.448 39.254
p-value NA <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Elasticity NA 0.043∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗
Elasticity s.e. NA (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.020)
Notes. Estimated by ordinary least squares. The dependent variable is first difference of usage (in thousands of kilometers per month). Gasoline
price is represented by CPI of 98 octane petrol, and Congestion is represented by the number of cars per kilometer. Age is in number of months
since registration; Relative policy-related sunk costs and Relative ex-policy price are the policy-related sunk costs and ex-policy price divided
by the CPI-adjusted average price per square meter in units of thousands of Singapore dollars. Robust standard errors clustered by car are
in parentheses. The F-test evaluates the null hypothesis that coefficients of relative policy-related sunk cost, relative ex-policy price, and
remaining horizon jointly are equal to zero; i.e., the rational model is valid.
∗∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗p < 0.1.
and their roads are subject to congestion. Hong Kong
imposes a one-off registration tax, which presently
ranges from 40% to 115%, but does not limit the sales
of new cars (no COE system or equivalent). Hence,
buying a new car in Hong Kong does not involve any
policy-induced sunk cost. The only possible sunk cost
is, as in most other countries, related to the retail price.
Unlike Singapore, the government of Hong Kong
does not publish the wholesale cost or retail price of
cars. We assume that the wholesale cost is the same
in Hong Kong and Singapore, which is reasonable, as
both cities aremajor ports quite distant from the source
of the cars. We procure the retail prices for several
Table 6. Hong Kong: Summary Statistics
Variables Mean s.d. Min Max
Usage 000’s km/month 1.106 0.535 0.244 4.347
Age of car at last service Months 50.8 22.4 8 119
Retail price HK$000,000’s 0.514 0.121 0.241 0.794
Gasoline price January 2006 100 97.9 15.22 73.6 123.9
Congestion Cars per kilometer 101.4 5.33 95.4 116.2
Note. As of January 1, 2007, US$1HK$7.8.
years, use the wholesale cost to impute the retail mar-
gin in Hong Kong, and then apply the same retail mar-
gin to calculate the retail prices in other years.
Table 6 reports summary statistics of the Hong Kong
data. The sample is much smaller, partly due to the
population of cars in Hong Kong being about one-
third smaller than in Singapore (in 2007, the number
of private cars was 372,203 in Hong Kong compared
with 571,041 in Singapore) and partly due to incom-
plete data. Average monthly usage is 1,106 kilometers,
which is about one-quarter lower than in the Singapore
sample, while the average car is 50.8months old, which
is about the same as in the Singapore sample.
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Figure 6. (Color online) Average Monthly Usage by Car Age
(Hong Kong)
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Note. For the most popular model in the sample (591 cars).
The big difference between the two markets is
in the retail price of cars. The retail price in the
Hong Kong sample ranges between HK$241,000 and
HK$794,000, with an average of HK$514,000 (equiva-
lent to US$65,900), which is about 40% less than the
Singapore average price. The index of gasoline prices
rose from 73.6 in June 2001 to 123.9 inApril 2013, while,
over the same period, the level of congestion rose from
about 95.4 to almost 116.2 cars per kilometer of road.
Referring to Figure 6, we note attenuation in usagewith
Table 7. Hong Kong: Sunk Cost and Car Usage
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Rational Horizon: Horizon: Horizon: Horizon: Horizon:
Variables model 20 months 24 months 28 months 32 months 36 months
Gasoline price, β1 × 10 −0.004 −0.001 −0.000 −0.001 −0.001 −0.002
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Congestion, β2 0.014∗∗ 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.009
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Age, φ1 × 10 −0.037∗∗∗ −0.143∗∗∗ −0.141∗∗∗ −0.127∗∗∗ −0.048 0.066
(0.014) (0.031) (0.037) (0.044) (0.049) (0.052)
Age squared, φ2 × 100 −0.001 0.008∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.005 −0.002 −0.010∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Retail price, ρλ4 −0.023∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Remaining horizon, λ2 × 10 0.239∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗ 0.090 −0.022
(0.052) (0.051) (0.055) (0.055) (0.050)
Observations 3,765 3,765 3,765 3,765 3,765 3,765
Cars 962 962 962 962 962 962
R-squared 0.023 0.027 0.026 0.026 0.025 0.025
ln likelihood −2,572 −2,564 −2,565 −2,566 −2,569 −2,568
F-test statistic 54.086 45.622 39.659 25.027 29.179
p-value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Elasticity 0.099∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗
Elasticity s.e. (0.026) (0.026) (0.036) (0.041) (0.039)
Notes. Estimated by ordinary least squares. The dependent variable is first difference of usage (in thousands of kilometers per month). Gasoline
price is represented by CPI of fuel, and Congestion is represented by the number of cars per kilometer. Age is in number of months since
registration, and Retail price is in millions of Hong Kong dollars. Robust standard errors clustered by car are in parentheses The F-test evaluates
the null hypothesis that coefficients of price and remaining horizon jointly are equal to zero; i.e., the rational model is valid.
∗∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗p < 0.1.
age of the car and faster attenuation among cars for
which prices were higher.
Table 7 presents the estimates of the behavioral
model of mental accounting for Hong Kong car buyers.
As a baseline, Table 7, column (a) reports the estimate
of the rational model. The coefficient of age, φ1, is neg-
ative and significant, while the coefficient of the square
of age, φ2, is not significant. This suggests that, among
Hong Kong car buyers, the novelty effect kicks in with-
out delay. In addition, the estimates suggest that gaso-
line prices do not affect usage significantly, although
congestion does.
In contrast with Singapore, the government of Hong
Kong does not impose sunk costs within specific
horizons. So we estimate the behavioral model for
alternative horizons, and we find that the effect of sunk
costs is insignificant for horizons exceeding 36 months.
However, there is significant evidence that the sunk
cost fallacy affects driving over horizons of 20 to
36 months. For all horizons, the coefficient of the retail
price, ρλ4 is negative and significant, and the F-test of
the restrictions, λ2  λ4  0, can be rejected. Hence, the
estimates suggest that drivers were influenced by sunk
costs.
We focus on the 20-month horizon (see Table 7, col-
umn (b)), which has a marginally better fit. The coef-
ficient of the retail price, ρλ4  −0.023 (s.e. 0.006),
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is negative and precisely estimated. This implies that
the elasticity of usage with respect to the retail price
is 0.099 (s.e. 0.026). The equivalent estimate for the
Singapore drivers (see Table A3, column (c), in the
online appendix) generates an estimated elasticity of
0.100 (s.e. 0.033), which is not significantly different.
Overall, we infer that the estimates with Hong Kong
data suggest that sunk costs related to the retail price
do influence car buyers to increase driving. The mental
accounting horizon is shorter than that among Singa-
pore drivers, and the elasticity of driving with respect
to the retail price is similar.
8. Implications for Public Policy and
Management
Our findings of the sunk cost effect have implica-
tions for public policy and management strategy.
The Singapore government manages traffic congestion
through pricing of road usage and limiting car own-
ership. By design, the ARF and the COE embody sub-
stantial sunk costs. Our results suggest that these sunk
costs resulted in the unintended consequence of stim-
ulating driving (among those who did buy a car).
Between January 2009 and January 2013, the Sin-
gapore government reduced the relevant quota of
COEs by 10,484 from 17,030 to 6,546. The quota
reduction coupled with growth of the Singapore econ-
omy resulted in the policy-related sunk cost rising by
S$13,038, from S$11,278 to S$24,316. Using our pre-
ferred estimate, this increase in the sunk cost would be
associated with an increase in monthly usage by 5.6%,
or 86 kilometers.
Hence, absent any other policy changes, the reduc-
tion in the COE quota would have affected road usage
in two ways. On the basis of the average driving in
our sample, the reduction in the number of cars would
have reduced driving (as the government intended) by
16.2 million kilometers a month.19 On the other hand,
mental accounting for sunk costs would have produced
a countervailing effect. On the basis of our preferred
estimate, the concomitant increase in the COE pre-
mium would have been associated with an increase
in driving (which the government did not intend) by
0.9 million kilometers a month.
Indeed, the Singapore government appreciates that
sunk costs affect driving: “[B]ecause sunk costs mat-
ter, the high fixed cost [sic] of car ownership can be
inimical to our objective of restraining car usage. Thus,
instead of simply relying on high car ownership cost to
manage congestion on the road, the Government has
been reducing vehicle taxes and shifting more towards
usage charges” (Lew and Leong 2009, p. 19).20 Besides,
the Singapore government has introduced incentives
to use public transport (Yang and Lim 2017).
Clearly, managers may be subject to psychological
biases. To the extent that managers are influenced by
sunk costs, our findings have implications for market-
ing, accounting, and other strategies with respect to
durable goods such as enterprise software, manufac-
turing equipment, and printers.
Producers of enterprise software such as Oracle and
SAP sell systems as well as complementary postsale
services to their installed base of customers. Similarly,
manufacturers such as Tetrapak and Hewlett-Packard
sell machinery as well as consumables to buyers of
their equipment. The “razor-blade” model suggests
setting a low price for the platform to entice customers
and then setting higher prices on the complementary
consumable to earn profits. If some buyers are myopic,
this proposition holds even if supply is competitive
(Gabaix and Laibson 2006).
By contrast, our findings suggest that the vendor
ought to price the platform relatively high, so that
the buyer will feel a need to mentally account for the
sunk cost of the purchase and hence step up pur-
chases of services and consumables. This implication
is in accordance with the previous literature on men-
tal accounting (Thaler 1980, pp. 49–50). Accordingly,
the profit-maximizing price of the platform balances
a lower price that attracts more myopic buyers and a
higher price that induces more consumption through
mental accounting for the sunk cost. The sunk cost fal-
lacy tends to moderate competition among sellers on
the platform. If a seller cuts the price of the platform,
it attracts buyers from competitors, but it also reduces
purchases of the consumable induced by the sunk cost.
On the buyer side, our findings suggest that man-
agers need to proactively debias their decisions on
usage of services and equipment involving large sunk
costs. They must be careful to avoid mental account-
ing and spending more on services and usage to justify
past sunk costs. They could subject themselves to the
discipline of a thought experiment: How much would
they spend on services and usage if sunk costs had
been zero? Alternatively, it might be appropriate to
revise the accounting system and procedures to elim-
inate reporting of sunk costs that might possibly bias
managerial decisions.
More generally, our findings resonate with previ-
ous research on organizational behavior showing that
managers escalate commitment in the face of unfa-
vorable conditions (Staw 1976, Staw and Hoang 1995,
Staw et al. 1997). To the extent that managers escalate
commitment to rationalize earlier decisions, they need
to proactively de-bias business strategy or be more
closely supervised, or both. Such escalating behavior is
another reason to revise accounting systems and pro-
cedures to eliminate reporting of sunk costs.
9. Concluding Remarks
Here, we investigate the effect of sunk costs on usage of
a durable good. First, we develop a behavioral model
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that incorporates mental accounting for sunk costs and
which nests rational behavior as a special case. In
the context of car usage, we characterize the optimal
dynamic driving behavior and how sunk costs might
affect driving over time.
Then, we take the model to a proprietary panel
data set of 8,264 cars between 2000 and 2013 in Sin-
gapore. Through structural estimates, we find com-
pelling evidence of the sunk cost fallacy. People who
incurred larger sunk costs in buying cars drove more
and their driving attenuated faster with the age of the
car. This effect of sunk costs was significant in the first
48 months of car ownership. Our results are robust
to various checks including alternative explanations in
terms of selection, the specification of sunk costs, and
salience of sunk costs.
Our empirical finding suggests that individuals do
not fully self-correct the effect of sunk costs on deci-
sion making even in repeated situations. Our estimates
suggest that usage of durable goods increases with the
sunk element of the price and attenuates over some
horizon, and that the rate of attenuation increases with
the sunk cost.
In contrast with our results, in field experiments,
Ashraf et al. (2010) and Cohen and Dupas (2010) found
no effect of price paid on consumer behavior. The dis-
parity in findings may be due to differences in context.
We investigate continuing usage of an expensive high-
involvement durable rather than a one-off purchase.
The limitation of our study is that it is observational,
being based on actual behavior in response to changes
in sunk costs as a result of continuing government pol-
icy. Since there is no random assignment of sunk costs
to different individuals, we cannot completely rule out
the apparent sunk cost effect being due to some unob-
served factor.
In future research, it would be good to investigate the
factors that influence the sunk cost effect and how indi-
viduals differ in their sensitivity to sunk costs. Are indi-
viduals more sensitive to sunk costs where the stakes
are larger and in a repeated situation, as suggested by
the difference between our results and those of Ashraf
et al. (2010) and Cohen and Dupas (2010)? Besides
duration of time, what other factors can amplify or mit-
igate the effect of sunk costs on decision making? Can
people learn to overcome the effect of sunk costs? If so,
what debiasing techniques will be most effective?
The answers to these questions would help policy
makers, managers, and consumers to correct sunk-cost
bias and make more effective decisions across multi-
ple contexts, including public policy, management of
businesses and organizations, and personal choice.
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Endnotes
1 In laboratory experiments, Phillips et al. (1991) and Friedman et al.
(2007) also did not find evidence of the sunk cost fallacy.
2 In organizational contexts, managers have been observed to
increase investment in the face of deteriorating conditions. Such
“escalation of commitment” has been interpreted as being made to
rationalize the decision maker’s earlier choice (Staw 1976, Staw and
Hoang 1995, Staw et al. 1997). However, the same increase in invest-
ment could also be interpreted as the rational outcome of the deci-
sion maker’s moral hazard, building of reputation (Kanodia et al.
1989, Camerer and Weber 1999), investment in a real option (Fried-
man et al. 2007, McAfee et al. 2010), or a memory shortcut (Baliga
and Ely 2011). For instance, Camerer and Weber (1999) reanalyzed
the Staw and Hoang (1995) data on escalation of commitment in
the deployment of NBA basketball players. After accounting for the
team managers’ incentives through two-stage estimation, the effect
of escalation of commitment was significantly reduced.
3Figure 1 presents usage from month 5 onward. Our data are based
on service visits. For the brand of cars in our sample, the first sched-
uled service is at cumulative usage of 12,000 kilometers. So, with the
average and standard deviation of usage being 1,545 and 529 kilome-
ters a month, respectively, the first service of the car would be in the
fifth month for the relatively heavy users (usage two standard devia-
tions above average). We observe that about 2% of the cars had their
first service before the fifth month. According to the service sched-
ule, these cars should have had much higher than average mileage.
To the contrary, many of these cars had lower than average mileage.
We infer that these cars were sent for service because of defects.
Accordingly, to avoid confounds resulting from defects, we focus on
usage after the fifth month of ownership.
4At the end of the 10th year, the owner can get a rebate of 50% of the
ARF by deregistering the car. Owners who renew the COE for the
same car must forfeit the 50% ARF rebate.
5 In the behavioral model, we also allow for part of the retail price,
unrelated to government policy, to be sunk.
6To the extent that congestion affects the COE premium, it is cur-
rent congestion that affects the current COE premium. However, our
empirical analysis below regresses current usage on the COE pre-
mium at the time of purchase, which is considerably earlier.
7Busse et al. (2015) find that weather affects consumer choice in buy-
ing new cars and show that the effect is due to projection bias and
salience.
8The quadratic functional form, (3), may be interpreted as a Taylor
series approximation of a more general benefit function that exhibits
diminishing marginal benefit.
9The online appendix presents and rejects two alternative explana-
tions based on selection: (1) demand shocks leading people to buy
cars at high prices followed by reversion to the mean driving inten-
sity and (2) high initial driving leading tomore frequent breakdowns
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and attenuation of driving. The online appendix also provides a sim-
ple formalization of the difference between selection and attenuation
due to the sunk cost fallacy.
10Empirically, the retail price of cars fell from 2000 to 2009, and then
rose again. As car prices fell, some households may have purchased
a second car and so, with two cars, would use each car relatively less,
thus giving rise to a correlation between lower car prices and less
usage of each car.
11Figure A1 in the online appendix depicts the distribution of the
sample by length of ownership.
12Table A1 in the online appendix reports an estimate based on a
larger sample of cars with usage within three standard deviations
of the average; the sample comprises 8,401 cars with 37,291 obser-
vations. The same table also reports an estimate based on a smaller
sample that includes all observations on cars with average monthly
usage up to 3,000 kilometers per month.
13Figure A2 in the online appendix depicts the distribution of the
sample by decile of home price over the years. Evidently, there is
considerable variation over time. Our empirical strategy abstracts
from this variation by specifying the dependent variable as the dif-
ference in usage between services. The differencing eliminates any
individual fixed effects in usage such as those due to differences in
household wealth.
14 In the empirical model, (19), the coefficients of gasoline price and
congestion are specified as −β1 and −β2, respectively. Hence, if β1 > 0
and β2 > 0, then driving decreases with the price of gasoline and
congestion.
15Consider an increase in the policy-related sunk costs, 0.25×ARF+
0.2 × COE, by S$10,000. This would increase usage over a planning
horizon of 48 months, with a larger increase in usage in the earlier
months and smaller increase in usage in the later months. By Table 4,
column (d), λ41  −0.177; thus, the total increase in usage would
be −λ41 ·∑48t1[48 − t + 1]  2,082 kilometers over 48 months, which
amounts to an average of 43.4 kilometers a month. (Note that, in the
estimating equation, the costs and price are measured in millions of
Singapore dollars and usage measured in thousands of kilometers.)
Dividing by the averagemonthly usage over the first 48months, 1,550
kilometers, the proportionate change is 43.4/1,550  2.8%. Divid-
ing by the average sunk cost, S$17,154, the proportionate change
in the sunk cost is 10,000/17,154  58.3%. Hence, the elasticity is
2.8/58.3 0.048.
16 Our estimates are based on the normalization θ2  1/2. The esti-
mated coefficients would change with the normalization, but the
counterfactual effects would remain the same as the estimated coef-
ficients adjust accordingly.
17As a robustness check, Table A2 in the online appendix reports the
estimates for the various horizons with the car prices, policy-related
sunk costs, and ex-policy prices deflated by the CPI.
18We test the hypothesis of selection combined with hedonic adap-
tation in two ways. One includes a lag of driving as an explanatory
variable. Hedonic adaptation implies that more driving in the pre-
vious period would reduce the marginal benefit of driving in the
current period, and hence reduce driving. Empirically, the coefficient
of lagged usage interacted with the car price is not significant. The
other test uses buying an expensive car and living in an expensive
area as proxies for age and experience in car purchase. Buyers with
more experience should be less subject to hedonic adaptation. The
empirical results are mixed: buyers of more expensive cars exhibit
less attenuation of usage over time, but buyers who live in more
expensive areas do not exhibit less attenuation of usage over time.
19As explained above, the government sets the COE quota so that the
overall car population (net of deregistered cars) does not a exceed
specified target. Hence, actually, the reduction in COE quota is bal-
anced by a fall in deregistrations.
20Lew and Leong (2009) mistook “sunk costs” as being synonymous
with “fixed costs.”
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